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Savino. Savino, 239 Va. at 544, 391 S.E.2d at 281.
As to Savino's contention that the Commonwealth failed to tell
him that its evaluation of him could result in testimony regarding his
future dangerousness, the Virginia Supreme Court held that he was
adequately notified of the purpose. The court relied on Woomerv. Aiken,
856 F.2d 677, 681 (4th Cir. 1988), cert denied, 109 S.Ct. 1560, (1989),
which it declared identical. However, in that case, the Fourth Circuit held
only that specific notification of the defendant is not required. Woomer,
856 F.2d at 682. Powell, which was decided after Woomer, made it very
clear that notification is necessary. Not only did Savino not get notice of
the Commonwealth's intention to make an evaluation of his mental
status for the purpose of producing evidence against him (see discussion
above), but also the statute clearly restricts the scope of his evaluation
and any testimony regarding that evaluation to his mental status at the
time of the offense. Apparently, because the Code conceivably allows
the State to use its evaluation of Savino against him for some purposes,
Savino is adequately notified by the existence of the Code authorizing
such use.
The issues above raise additional questions not addressed by the
court. If the defendant must submit to an evaluation by the Common-
wealth, which might result in an affirmative case in aggravation against
him, as a condition to even exploring the plausibility of presenting
evidence in mitigation, the defendant is put in the precarious position of
choosing between his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimi-
nation and sixth amendment rights to put on evidence and of assistance
of counsel. What should defense counsel do once notified of the
Commonwealth's intentions?
There are a number of options available to capital defense counsel
when considering the issues raised by use of mental health experts in
mitigation. Ultimately, each is a tactical decision which rests on the
unique aspects of a particularcase. A threshold determination is whether
a mental health expert will be helpful at all. For an expert to be useful,
or for the defense to be able to deal with the consequences, counsel must
be willing to engage in an extensive investigation into the defendant's
background before the evaluation and a followup investigation after-
ward.
If an expert's evaluation is used, and the Commonwealth responds
with a request for its own examination, counsel may either instruct the
client to say nothing or to cooperate short of making any incriminating
statements or commenting on the crime. If this option is used, a finding
under the statute could be made that the defendant refused to participate
and that any evidence from his own expert's evaluation will be precluded.
Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.3:1 (F) (Repl. Vol. 1990). However, there is
a substantial constitutional question raised by preclusion of evidence
which is basic to an effective defense, particularly in the context of
mitigation evidence at a capital trial. (See Bennett, Is Preclusion Under
Va. CodeAnn. 19.2-2643:1 Unconstitutional?, Capital Defense Digest,
Vol. 2, No. 1, p. 24, (1989)). Another option is that counsel could insist
on being present at any evaluation conducted by the State, on the basis
of the sixth amendment right to counsel as established in Powell. An-
other option is to cooperate fully with the Commonwealth as provided
in 3:1 while objecting vigorously and preserving the constitutional
arguments identified above.
Whenever the Commonwealth files a motion for an evaluation
pursuant to 3:1(F), defense counsel should file and argue a motion in
limine to ensure that scope of the Commonwealth's evaluation does not
exceed that authorized by 3:1. The motion in limine should also seek an
order that the expert's subsequent testimony may not be used to establish
aggravating evidence at the penalty trial.
The instant case also spotlights the nightmarish possible effects of
a voluntary guilty plea in Virginia. In non-capital cases, entry of a guilty
plea may be a sound tactical choice. However, many, if not most, such
non-capital cases are not appealed in the federal or state system. Quite
the opposite is true in capital cases. Especially considering the scope of
the waiver doctrine announced by the Virginia Supreme Court, guilty
pleas should not be entered to a charge of capital murder absent formal
or very strong informal agreements that a life sentence will be imposed.
Summary and analysis by:
Anne E. Mclnerney
MU'MIN v. COMMONWEALTH
239 Va. 433,389 S.E.2d 886 (1990)
Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
Dawud Majid Mu'Min was an inmate serving a sentence for first
degree murder. While assigned to a work detail for the Virginia De-
partment of Transportation, he eluded supervision. After walking a mile
along Interstate 95, he entered a retail carpet store and, according to his
testimony, asked the operator about oriental rugs. A violent episode
occurred. He removed several dollars from the scene and returned to the
work crew.
The store operator, near death, was found with her blouse and
brassiere pulled up above her breasts. She was also naked below the
waist. The autopsy report indicated numerous bruises and lacerations as
well as a deep puncture wound to the the left lung and the neck. The
victim's genital area was undisturbed.
Mu'Min was found guilty of capital murder in the commission of
a robbery while armed with a deadly weapon, and of capital murder
while the accused was a prisoner confined in a State or local correctional
facility. Va. Code Ann. §§ 18.2-31(4), 18.2-31(3) (1990). He was
acquitted on a third charge of capital murder in the commission of or
subsequent to rape. Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31(5) (1990).
HOLDING
Some claims and holdings of this case are not discussed in this
summary because they are either too fact specific or are treated in too
conclusory a fashion to lend guidance to the bar. The holdings of the
Virginia Supreme Court which merit discussion in this summary be-
cause of their potential value to practitioners include the following: (1)
refusing to allow defendant to ask "content questions" to determine what
pretrial publicity prospective jurors had been exposed to is not a denial
of due process of law or a violation of the right to trial by an impartial
jury; (2) it is immaterial to the validity of the death sentence that the
Commonwealth's bill of particulars did not contain the word "torture"
when the aggravating factor of vileness can otherwise be established; (3)
multiple grievous wounds are sufficient to prove torture; and (4) a
prospective juror expressing work related concerns over jury duty need
not be excused unless such concerns involve a personal hardship.
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
1. Voir Dire and Publicity
Capital Defense Digest - Page 18
The most controversial issue in the case is the effect of pre-trial
publicity upon the jury selection process. This issue was discussed at
length in a dissent and was recently granted certiorari by the U.S.
Supreme Court. Mu'Min v. Virginia, cert. granted, 59 U.S.L.W. 3275
(U.S. Oct. 9, 1990)(No. 90-5193). The majority held that, while counsel
may ask a prospective juror whether he or she has acquired information
before trial, it does not follow that litigants have a constitutional right to
know what that information is. The court stated that a party may not
"extend voir dire questioning ad infinitum." Mu'Min v. Commonwealth,
239 Va. 433,442 n.5,389 S.E.2d 886,892 n.5 (1990) (quotingLeVasseur
v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 564, 581, 304 S.E.2d 644, 653 (1983)).
The dissenting opinion in Mu'Min found "'manifest error' in the
refusal to permit any of the questions necessary to establish a factual and
objective basis for assessing juror impartiality." Mu'Min, 239 Va. at
453,389 S.E.2d at 899. Justice Whiting took note of the unusual amount
of pretrial publicity regarding Mu'Min and the community concern that
might arise once local residents discover that prisoners convicted of
violent crimes were permitted to work in such close contact with the
public.
The dissent began its analysis with the Virginia Code which
provides that "counsel for either party shall have the right to examine
under oath any person who is called as ajuror... and shall have the right
to ask such person... directly any relevant question to ascertain whether
he... is sensible of any bias or prejudice." Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-358
(1984). Jusice Whiting questioned the majority's use of LeVasseur for
the proposition that counsel may not extend voir dire ad infinitum with
a quote from the same case which specifies that "[t]he court must afford
a party a full and fair opportunity to ascertain whether prospectivejurors
'stand indifferent in the cause."' Mu'Min, 239 Va. at 455, 389 S.E.2d at
900, (quoting LeVasseur, 225 Va. at 581, 304 S.E.2d at 653).
The dissent asserted that a juror's assurance of impartiality is
insufficient, particularly where "the prospective jurors could simply
remain silent as an implied indication of a lack of bias or prejudice."
Mu'Min 239 Va. 457, 389 S.E.2d at 901. Justice Whiting provided
considerable case support for the position that counsel should be
permitted to conduct an examination to elicit answers permitting an
objective basis for the court's evaluation. His argument included the
Virginia Supreme Court's observation that "however willing the juror
might be to trust himself, the law will not trust him" Breeden v. Com-
monwealth, 217 Va. 297,298,227 S.E.2d 734,735 (1976), and "[t]he
issue of who is, or is not, a competent juror is one for the trial court to
decide."Justus v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 971,976,266 S.E.2d 87,91
(1980)(quoting Slade v. Commonwealth, 155 Va. 1099, 156 S.E. 388
(1931)).
The majority referred to United States v. Haldeman for the
proposition that asking prospective jurors "content questions" is not a
matter of right. 559 F.2d31,67-8 (D.C. Cir. 1976)(enbanc), cert. denied,
97 S.Ct. 2641 (1977)(affirming trial court's rejection of "content
questions" on voir dire related to pretrial publicity). This is the first time
that Haldeman has been cited by the Virginia Supreme Court.
In the dissent's view, the majority misconstrued the holding in
Haldeman because that opinion also recognized a distinction between
the sources and intensity of a venireman's exposure to pretrial publicity
andhis recollection of the contentofthatpublicity. Indeed, theHaldeman
court went so far as to state that "it would have been reversible error for
the [lower] court to accept jurors simply because they said they would
be fair.... however, the [lower] court... acted on not only the jurors'
subjective assurances but also objective information relatinghow closely
they had followed Watergate and their sources of information." 559 F.2d
at 67 n.51 (D.C. Cir.1976). Justice Whiting concluded that:
mhe trial court's conduct of voir dire was constitutionally
inadequate, even under Haldeman, in its blanket refusal to
permit any questions aimed at determining the sources and
intensity of exposure to pretrial publicity (e.g., where did you
hear about this case; how many times did you hear it; and
when did you hear about it.)
Mu'Min 239 Va. at 458-59, 389 S.E.2d at 902 (emphasis in original).
The dissent's support for questioningjurors regarding sources and
extent of exposure to pretrial publicity should have a fair chance of
prevailing on federal sixth amendmentgrounds. EvenifJustice Whiting's
dissent does not signal an approaching change in Virginia, counsel
should take extra measures of care to preserve this matter on federal
grounds when the entire panel has been exposed to prejudicial media
coverage. Such measures include objecting to jurors individually and to
the seating of the entire panel at the close of voir dire.
2. Notice and Opportunity to Defend Against Aggravating
Factors
The court's action in rejecing Mu'Min's claim that he was not
informed that a death sentence could be based on torture and in
sustaining the application of the "vileness" aggravating factor should be
viewed in light of federal constitutional requirements.
The Supreme Court of Virginia has held that a death sentence may
be supported by proof of any of the three components of the vileness
factor, i.e., torture, depravity of mind, or aggravated battery. Bunch v.
Commonwealth, 225 Va. 423,304 S.E.2d 271, cert. den. 464 U.S. 977,
reh. den. 464 U.S. 1064 (1983); see also, Falkner, The Constitutional
Deficiencies of Virginia's "Vileness" Aggravating Factor, Capital
Defense Digest Vol. 2, No. 1, p. 19 (Nov. 1989).
In turning aside the claim that Mu'Min was prejudiced by the
absence of torture on the Commonwealth's bill of particulars, the court
misses the essence of the claim, that is, denial of notice and opportunity
to controvert the evidence on which a sentence of death may be based.
Counsel should insist pretrial that the Commonwealth be required to
disclose the basis on which it will seek the death penalty and that the
Commonwealth be confined to that which it discloses. (See summary of
Lewis v. Jeffers, Capital Defense Digest, this issue.)
3. Definition of "Torture" and Instructions on "Vileness"
With respect to state supreme court affirmance of a death sentence
based on vileness, the United States Supreme Court in Godfrey v.
Georgia,446 U.S. 420 (1980), andMaynardv. Cartwright,486 U.S. 356
(1988), has established that: (a) the statutory language of the factor alone
is insufficient to guide the jury in a constitutionally acceptable manner,
and (b) a constitutionally sufficient narrowing construction or definition
of the factor must be communicated to the sentencer or applied on
appellate review.
In Virginia, a narrowing construction has not been given to the
torture component of vileness. In the instant case, the Virginia Supreme
Court, without defining torture, found that the evidence of multiple
grievous wounds to the victim was sufficient to prove torture. Mu'Min,
239 Va. at 450, 389 S.E.2d at 897. Such wounds are plausibly indicative
of aggravated battery, but a characterization of torture is suspect. There
is no evidence that defendant had a desire to prolong the victim's
suffering orwas evenaware ofit.Theneteffectof theholding inMu'Min
is that aggravated battery equals torture.
There is a narrowing construction in Virginia for aggravated
battery. "[W]e construe the words 'aggravatedbattery' to mean abattery
which, qualitatively and quantitatively, is more culpable than the
minimum necessary to accomplish an act of murder." Smith v. Com-
monwealth, 219 Va. 455,478,248 S.E.2d 135,149 (1978); but cf. Stout
v. Commonwealth, 237 Va. 126, 376 S.E.2d 288, cert. den. 109 S.Ct.
3263 (1989) (single knife wound constituted aggravated battery). The
sufficiency of this construction has not been tested in federal court.
The Mu'Min opinion does not indicate whether the narrowing
construction of aggravated battery was ever given to the jury, but the
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Virginia Supreme Court has taken the position that the vileness factor
contains terms of common understanding that need no definition. Clark
v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 211 (1979); see also Falkner, The Consti-
tutional Deficiencies of Virginia's "Vileness" Aggravating Factor,
Capital Defense Digest Vol. 2, No. 1, p. 19 (1989).
By motion, objection, and proposed jury instruction, defense
counsel must oppose imposition of the death penalty based on the
vileness factor as currently construed and applied in Virginia.
4. Juror Qualification
Lastly, the court acknowledged that a prospective juror's duty to
serve may be deferred or limited "if serving on a jury... would cause
such a person a particular occupational inconvenience." Va. Code Ann.
§ 8.01-341.2 (1990). In the instant case the court found no errorin seating
the prospective juror because he did not express personal financial
hardship, but instead felt his services were of timely concern to his
employer. Service as a juror is a duty and excuse from jury duty is a
privilege. "The privilege, one the statute makes available at the discre-
tion of the trial court, is purely personal to the prospective juror and
altogether unrelated to the inconvenience suffered by the person's
employer." Mu'Min, 239 Va. at 444-45,389 S.E.2d at 894.
In a related claim by defendant, the Virginia Supreme Court found
that a juror who knew the victim casually could sit as a member of the
jury because she affirmed under oath that she could stand indifferent in
the cause.
Summary and analysis by:
Christopher J. Lonsbury
SMITH v. COMMONWEALTH
239 Va. 243,389 S.E.2d 871 (1990)
Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
On July 24, 1988, Roy Bruce Smith engaged in a gun battle with the
police outside his home inManassas, Virginia. During the shootout, one
police officer was killed. Smith claimed that he did not discharge his
weapon until after he had been shot in the foot by an unknown gunman.
He further claimed that he did not know the victim was a police officer,
or that he had killed anyone during the shooting. Smith said he thought
the police were intruders.
Smith was drunk on the night of the shooting and was reported to have
said he would kill a police officer. In order to attract the police, Smith
began firing a rifle from his front porch. The police arrived and Smith
fled to the back of his home. In the ensuing gunfight, the victim received
multiple wounds, one apparently self-inflicted, and a mortal gunshot
wound to the head fired at very close range. Smith made statements
while struggling with the police that were used to show he knew the
victim was a police officer. The trial court found Smith guilty of capital
murder in the willful, deliberate and premeditated killing of a law
enforcement officer for the purpose of interfering with the performance
of the officer's official duties. Va. Code Ann. 1950 § 18.2-31(6) (1990).
Smith was sentenced to death.
HOLDING
The court held that Virginia's capital murder statute, both as written
and applied, is not unconstitutional. Smith had challenged the capital
murder statute on the grounds that it does not provide an in-depth
analysis in determining whether a sentence of death was imposed under
the influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor. Several
claims were raised on appeal which were dependent on the particular
facts of the case or were dealt with in a conclusory manner by the
Virginia Supreme Court. These claims are not discussed in this case
summary.
A. Exclusion of Diminished Capacity Evidence
The court decided that the testimony of Smith's psychiatrist was
rightfully excluded. The testimony was in support of a diminished
capacity defense. The court affirmed the trial court's rejection of this
testimony on the ground that it would interfere with the jury's right to
find specific intent. The court relied on Stamper v. Commonwealth, 228
Va. 707 at 717, 324 S.E.2d 682 at 688 (1985), which held "[u]nless an
accused contends that he was beyond (the borderline of insanity) when
he acted, his mental state is immaterial to the issue of specific intent."
Smith v. Commonwealth, 239 Va. 243 at 259, 389 S.E.2d 871 at 879
(1990). Apparently, in order to establish diminished capacity, a defen-
dant must be prepared to demonstrate that at the time of the crime his
condition was tantamount to that of a clinically insane person.
B. Jury Instructions - Second Degree Murder
Smith argued that an instruction allowing the jury to infer malice
from his deliberate use of a deadly weapon was erroneous. Smith said
this instruction violated Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979).
Sandstrom forbidsjury instructions from which a reasonablejuror could
derive a mandatory presumption against the defendant for an element of
the offense, or instructions which would allowajuror to presume that the
burden of proof shifts to the defendant. The Smith court, however, ap-
plied the rule in Warlitner v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 348, 228 S.E.2d
698 (1976), which allows ajury to imply malice from the deliberate use
of a deadly weapon. The court reasoned that Warlitner-type instructions
do not constitute a shift of proof or a mandatory presumption against the
defendant that is significant enough to allow a reasonable juror to place
an incorrect burden on the defendant in violation of Sandstrom.
C. Jury Instructions - Premeditation
The court held that an instruction defining premeditation as "specific
intent to kill"was not improper. Smith, 239 Va. at 263,389 S.E.2d at 882.
Smith had offered an instruction equating premeditation with the "de-
sign to kill". The court approved the former instruction but cited with
approval the definition "adopt a specific intent to kill". Id. at 263, 389
S.E.2d 882 (emphasis added). This holding allows the thought process
necessary for premeditated murder to occur simultaneously with the
forming of specific intent, but still describes a process and not simply a
mental state.
D. Victim Impact Statement
The court decided that the submission of a victim impact statement
prepared by the slain officer's widow was not improperly considered by
the trial judge. The victim impact statement was never shown to the jury,
nor did they know of its existence. Smith claimed that because the judge
